Mission Architecture for Maritime Domain Awareness Using Small Satellites

NPS NRP Executive SummaryMission Architecture for Maritime Domain Awareness Using Small SatellitesN2/N6 - Information WarfareThis research is supported by funding from the Naval Postgraduate School, Naval Research Program (PE 0605853N/2098). https://nps.edu/nrpChief of Naval Operations (CNO)Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.

Bento Box - Modular Stratospheric Balloon Payload to Enable Artificial Intelligence for Small Unit Maneuver

NPS NRP Executive SummaryGuaranteed access to communication, navigation, & data transfer networks is required for successful AI-enabled mission execution. In light of great power competition, SOF must identify unique/novel methods to maintain continuous airborne surveillance, uninterrupted comms, and accurate navigation inputs to facilitate tactical maneuver in contested battlespaces. High-altitude balloons (HABs) offer a potential low-cost/low-observable method to increase force projection across domains and provide the infrastructure required to support NSW tactical maneuver. Using HABs would offload dirty, dull, & dangerous tasks from manned systems and transition them to those with potential to operate autonomously using robotics and AI. Opportunities for collaboration with stakeholders have been identified that will enable us to reach our objectives: 1) collection of stakeholder requirements to design/prototype a bus (called Bento Box) that meets modularity requirements and sets an industry benchmark for future high-altitude system designs, and 2) demonstrate modularity and the ability to integrate with an autonomous recovery vehicle; both major conceptual barriers for HAB adoption. To achieve these, we'll use standard aerospace modeling/simulation techniques in preliminary design phases, then leverage existing HAB systems, a CubeSat form factor developed by the NPS Space Systems Academic Group, and other designs in development, finally, we will use an existing recovery vehicle to demonstrate the feasibility of using the system to enable AISUM concepts. Deliverables include: a preliminary design review package, prototype, recovery vehicle integration, and a detailed technical report. Lastly, HABs are accessible compared to space systems, making them excellent experimentation platforms for tech/TTPs designed to support AISUM; in this regard, there exists unprecedented potential for innovation cycle iteration at a superior frequency and price point compared to contemporary methods.Naval Special Warfare Command (NAVSPECWARCOM)N7 - Warfighting DevelopmentThis research is supported by funding from the Naval Postgraduate School, Naval Research Program (PE 0605853N/2098). https://nps.edu/nrpChief of Naval Operations (CNO)Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.

Nuclear Deterrence and the Space and Cyber domains

NPS NRP Technical ReportThe space and cyber domains are becoming increasingly intertwined in both conventional and theoretical nuclear conflicts. Deterrence strategies involving aggression, escalation, and deterrence must evolve with ever changing reality of the world situation. The space and cyber domains are unique from other domains since actions taken in these domains may be unattributable to a state actor and damage that occurs may be non-kinetic yet severe at the same time. In the past the U.S. has clearly defined nuclear redlines and communicated these to potential adversaries to help them understand actions which could be interpreted by the U.S. as precursor to nuclear aggression. Clearly communicated nuclear redlines seem to have been effective strategy at deterring the actions defined by the redline. In many cases potential adversaries have protested some of the redlines, but regardless of their protest in practically every case they still abided by them. It is vitally important that nuclear redlines evolve as the world situation and technology progress. This is not a simple task. Many space and cyber assets are dual tasked with conventional and nuclear missions. This project will help define which events in these domains is significant enough to warrant a kinetic response from the U.S., and which may justified crossing the nuclear threshold. With this understanding, recommendations will be made to improve or modify U.S. nuclear deterrence strategy if necessary. Keywords: Nuclear Deterrence, Strategic Deterrence, Space domain, cyber domain, crossdomainN3/N5 - Plans & StrategyThis research is supported by funding from the Naval Postgraduate School, Naval Research Program (PE 0605853N/2098). https://nps.edu/nrpChief of Naval Operations (CNO)Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.

Nuclear Deterrence and Arms Control Agreements between three Peer Adversaries

NPS NRP Executive SummaryThis research will investigate the implications of China as a peer nuclear armed adversary and how this effects US deterrence strategy that has traditionally been concerned with bilateral deterrence between the USA and Russia. The introduction of a third peer nuclear armed nation adds significant complexity and dynamics that were not present before. China has not been party to previous nuclear arms control agreements and they have been developing their nuclear capabilities at a faster pace than any other nation. However, they have committed to the Nuclear Nonproliferation treaty and a policy of no first use. It is vital to understand what motivates Chinese leadership, and what would cause them to voluntarily engage in arms control agreements with the purpose of adding stability to nuclear deterrence between the three nations. This research will help understand these issues, as well as offer recommendations to modify US nuclear deterrence to better deter and stabilize deterrence between the US and China while maintaining effective deterrence between the US and Russia. Also, the power dynamics between China and Russia must also be understood to help implement policies to support, and avoid mistakes that could undermine, deterrence between them.N3/N5 - Plans & StrategyThis research is supported by funding from the Naval Postgraduate School, Naval Research Program (PE 0605853N/2098). https://nps.edu/nrpChief of Naval Operations (CNO)Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.

Nuclear Deterrence and the Space and Cyber domains

NPS NRP Project PosterThe space and cyber domains are becoming increasingly intertwined in both conventional and theoretical nuclear conflicts. Deterrence strategies involving aggression, escalation, and deterrence must evolve with ever changing reality of the world situation. The space and cyber domains are unique from other domains since actions taken in these domains may be unattributable to a state actor and damage that occurs may be non-kinetic yet severe at the same time. In the past the U.S. has clearly defined nuclear redlines and communicated these to potential adversaries to help them understand actions which could be interpreted by the U.S. as precursor to nuclear aggression. Clearly communicated nuclear redlines seem to have been effective strategy at deterring the actions defined by the redline. In many cases potential adversaries have protested some of the redlines, but regardless of their protest in practically every case they still abided by them. It is vitally important that nuclear redlines evolve as the world situation and technology progress. This is not a simple task. Many space and cyber assets are dual tasked with conventional and nuclear missions. This project will help define which events in these domains is significant enough to warrant a kinetic response from the U.S., and which may justified crossing the nuclear threshold. With this understanding, recommendations will be made to improve or modify U.S. nuclear deterrence strategy if necessary. Keywords: Nuclear Deterrence, Strategic Deterrence, Space domain, cyber domain, crossdomainN3/N5 - Plans & StrategyThis research is supported by funding from the Naval Postgraduate School, Naval Research Program (PE 0605853N/2098). https://nps.edu/nrpChief of Naval Operations (CNO)Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.

Nuclear Deterrence and the Space and Cyber domains

NPS NRP Executive SummaryThe space and cyber domains are becoming increasingly intertwined in both conventional and theoretical nuclear conflicts. Deterrence strategies involving aggression, escalation, and deterrence must evolve with ever changing reality of the world situation. The space and cyber domains are unique from other domains since actions taken in these domains may be unattributable to a state actor and damage that occurs may be non-kinetic yet severe at the same time. In the past the U.S. has clearly defined nuclear redlines and communicated these to potential adversaries to help them understand actions which could be interpreted by the U.S. as precursor to nuclear aggression. Clearly communicated nuclear redlines seem to have been effective strategy at deterring the actions defined by the redline. In many cases potential adversaries have protested some of the redlines, but regardless of their protest in practically every case they still abided by them. It is vitally important that nuclear redlines evolve as the world situation and technology progress. This is not a simple task. Many space and cyber assets are dual tasked with conventional and nuclear missions. This project will help define which events in these domains is significant enough to warrant a kinetic response from the U.S., and which may justified crossing the nuclear threshold. With this understanding, recommendations will be made to improve or modify U.S. nuclear deterrence strategy if necessary. Keywords: Nuclear Deterrence, Strategic Deterrence, Space domain, cyber domain, crossdomainN3/N5 - Plans & StrategyThis research is supported by funding from the Naval Postgraduate School, Naval Research Program (PE 0605853N/2098). https://nps.edu/nrpChief of Naval Operations (CNO)Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.

Nuclear Deterrence and Arms Control Agreements between three Peer Adversaries

NPS NRP Technical ReportThis research will investigate the implications of China as a peer nuclear armed adversary and how this effects US deterrence strategy that has traditionally been concerned with bilateral deterrence between the USA and Russia. The introduction of a third peer nuclear armed nation adds significant complexity and dynamics that were not present before. China has not been party to previous nuclear arms control agreements and they have been developing their nuclear capabilities at a faster pace than any other nation. However, they have committed to the Nuclear Nonproliferation treaty and a policy of no first use. It is vital to understand what motivates Chinese leadership, and what would cause them to voluntarily engage in arms control agreements with the purpose of adding stability to nuclear deterrence between the three nations. This research will help understand these issues, as well as offer recommendations to modify US nuclear deterrence to better deter and stabilize deterrence between the US and China while maintaining effective deterrence between the US and Russia. Also, the power dynamics between China and Russia must also be understood to help implement policies to support, and avoid mistakes that could undermine, deterrence between them.N3/N5 - Plans & StrategyThis research is supported by funding from the Naval Postgraduate School, Naval Research Program (PE 0605853N/2098). https://nps.edu/nrpChief of Naval Operations (CNO)Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.

Nuclear Deterrence and Arms Control Agreements between three Peer Adversaries

NPS NRP Project PosterThis research will investigate the implications of China as a peer nuclear armed adversary and how this effects US deterrence strategy that has traditionally been concerned with bilateral deterrence between the USA and Russia. The introduction of a third peer nuclear armed nation adds significant complexity and dynamics that were not present before. China has not been party to previous nuclear arms control agreements and they have been developing their nuclear capabilities at a faster pace than any other nation. However, they have committed to the Nuclear Nonproliferation treaty and a policy of no first use. It is vital to understand what motivates Chinese leadership, and what would cause them to voluntarily engage in arms control agreements with the purpose of adding stability to nuclear deterrence between the three nations. This research will help understand these issues, as well as offer recommendations to modify US nuclear deterrence to better deter and stabilize deterrence between the US and China while maintaining effective deterrence between the US and Russia. Also, the power dynamics between China and Russia must also be understood to help implement policies to support, and avoid mistakes that could undermine, deterrence between them.N3/N5 - Plans & StrategyThis research is supported by funding from the Naval Postgraduate School, Naval Research Program (PE 0605853N/2098). https://nps.edu/nrpChief of Naval Operations (CNO)Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.

Bento Box - Modular Stratospheric Balloon Payload to Enable Artificial Intelligence for Small Unit Maneuver

NPS NRP Project PosterGuaranteed access to communication, navigation, & data transfer networks is required for successful AI-enabled mission execution. In light of great power competition, SOF must identify unique/novel methods to maintain continuous airborne surveillance, uninterrupted comms, and accurate navigation inputs to facilitate tactical maneuver in contested battlespaces. High-altitude balloons (HABs) offer a potential low-cost/low-observable method to increase force projection across domains and provide the infrastructure required to support NSW tactical maneuver. Using HABs would offload dirty, dull, & dangerous tasks from manned systems and transition them to those with potential to operate autonomously using robotics and AI. Opportunities for collaboration with stakeholders have been identified that will enable us to reach our objectives: 1) collection of stakeholder requirements to design/prototype a bus (called Bento Box) that meets modularity requirements and sets an industry benchmark for future high-altitude system designs, and 2) demonstrate modularity and the ability to integrate with an autonomous recovery vehicle; both major conceptual barriers for HAB adoption. To achieve these, we'll use standard aerospace modeling/simulation techniques in preliminary design phases, then leverage existing HAB systems, a CubeSat form factor developed by the NPS Space Systems Academic Group, and other designs in development, finally, we will use an existing recovery vehicle to demonstrate the feasibility of using the system to enable AISUM concepts. Deliverables include: a preliminary design review package, prototype, recovery vehicle integration, and a detailed technical report. Lastly, HABs are accessible compared to space systems, making them excellent experimentation platforms for tech/TTPs designed to support AISUM; in this regard, there exists unprecedented potential for innovation cycle iteration at a superior frequency and price point compared to contemporary methods.Naval Special Warfare Command (NAVSPECWARCOM)N7 - Warfighting DevelopmentThis research is supported by funding from the Naval Postgraduate School, Naval Research Program (PE 0605853N/2098). https://nps.edu/nrpChief of Naval Operations (CNO)Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.

Progress in reducing vibration levels on the Naval Postgraduate School Cube-Sat launcher

The Operationally Unique Technologies Satellite (OUTSat), the Government Experimental Multi-Satellite (GEMSat), and the Unique Lightweight Technology and Research Auxiliary Satellite (ULTRASat) missions, launched in 2012, 2013, and May 2015, successfully deployed a total of 33 CubeSats from Poly-Picosatellite Orbital Deployers (P-PODS) mounted to the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) CubeSat Launcher (NPSCuL) on the aft end of the Atlas V Centaur upper stage. An additional 13 CubeSats are scheduled to launch on the Government Rideshare Advanced Concepts Experiment (GRACE) in September 2015. Force-limited vibration testing (FLVT) has been effective on all four missions in reducing the low-frequency vibration test environment at the P-POD interface on NPSCuL; however, the CubeSats were still subjected to high-frequency amplifications from the NPSCuL structure. Implementing commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) isolators at the base of the NPSCuL structure has recently been shown to significantly reduce the high-frequency amplifications. This paper discusses the testing and the resulting 35-85% drop in overall G(RMS) vibration test levels, a welcome reduction in the CubeSat vibration test envirionment on NPSCuL. This reduction should allow more sensitive payloads to fly on future NPSCuL missions, and the implementation of low-cost, COTS isolators could possibly be useful for other small satellites and CubeSat launch applications.NRO Office of Space Launch and Cube Sat Program Office.Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited